In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the (...) two worlds are subjectively indistinguishable for them, which is what matters on internalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that even if a standard moral of the New Evil Genius intuition is untenable due to considerations arising from content externalism, the case can be understood as supporting epistemic internalism in a way that is wholly compatible with content externalism. In short, epistemic internalism is committed to sameness of justificatory status between subjectively indistinguishable counterparts, not sameness of content of their justifiers. (shrink)

The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague (...) objects should not be taken, in itself, to imply the more radical thesis that the identity relation can be one of "degree". one can hold that the concept of degrees of identity is absurd (how can one thing be more or less identical to another?) "and" that indeterminacy in identity is possible; hence, any incoherence in the idea of degrees of identity does not thereby undermine the idea of indeterminate identity. (shrink)

Psychological determinants of contraceptive use were investigated in Great Britain and Germany, using national data obtained in 1992. It was hypothesised that current contraceptive use among sexually active, fertile women aged 15-45 was related to their attitude towards the various contraceptive methods, social influences, perceptions of being able to use a method correctly and consistently, a correct estimation of fertility, and communication with their partner. Effects of age and country were also taken into account.The attitude of respondents towards the various (...) contraceptive methods was ambivalent and no method was seen as ideal. On medical methods many respondents expressed doubts as to their safety for health. Social influences most frequently concerned the use of OCs. Respondents considered themselves able to use oral contraceptives correctly, but expressed general fear about intrauterine devices and sterilisation, and many women believed they were not able to use condoms and periodic abstinence consistently.Multifactorial analyses revealed that current contraceptive use was principally determined by social influences, attitude and self-efficacy with respect to medical methods. Age and country, and, for use of unreliable methods, fertility awareness also played a role. Communication with the partner was less relevant.Contraceptive choice depended greatly on encouragement to use and being in favour of medical methods. A lack of social support for use of medical methods and a negative attitude towards them was related to higher use rates of condoms, periodic abstinence, withdrawal and reliance on ‘luck’. In the case of withdrawal and/or no method, underestimation of fertility played an additional role.Contraceptive choice appears to be determined more by a general like or dislike of medical methods rather than on a weighing of the merits of individual available methods. (shrink)